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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute and ordinance unambiguously require subdivision approval only if the 
proposed property division is for Mthe purpose11 of development or sale. The phrase Mthe 
purpose'1 must be read to refer to the primary purpose. This Court must interpret the statute 
based on the language used by the Legislature, not based on what others wish the Legislature 
had done, even though it may create some uncertainty in determining what was the purpose 
of a particular parcel division. 
There is no evidence that the lot Reagans later sold to Cendant was created for the 
purpose of development or sale. Even if the two lots created by Reagans are considered 
together, the primary purpose for creating the lots was to obtain a lower interest rate, and 
formal subdivision approval was not required. To the extent there was contrary evidence, 
a trial would be required to determine what was the primary purpose for creating the lot. 
Even if the lot was improperly created, it did not violate the covenants of the warranty 
deed. Utah case authority holds that covenant of good right to convey only requires legal 
title to the land. Reagans had good title, and thus did not breach the covenant of good right 
to convey. 
An "encumbrance" within the scope of the covenant against encumbrances does not, 
under Utah law, include zoning violations. The cases from other states cited by Cendant 
have found zoning violations to be encumbrances only when the fact of violation could be 
determined from the public records. Because Utah's subdivision laws focus on the purpose 
for dividing property, the public records would not reveal whether a parcel division was 
proper. Therefore, an improper subdivision does not constitute an encumbrance under Utah 
law. 
Because there was a material factual dispute as to whether Cendant could restore the 
house to the status quo ante, summary judgment was improper. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I: REAGANS' PURPOSE IN DIVIDING THE LOT WAS NOT 
DEVELOPMENT OR RESALE. 
Reagans created two lots of just under ten acres. Only one of those lots was sold to 
Cendant. That is the lot on which Mr. Reagan had constructed a house. There can be no 
dispute that the only purpose for creating that house lot was to become eligible for a lower 
interest rate. There was no other purpose for creating the house lot. At the time he created 
the house lot, Reagan had no thought of moving or of selling his house. Because there was 
no purpose of resale or development in the creation of the house lot, the creation of that lot 
did not violate any law. 
Cendant focuses on the other lot. a vacant lot retained by Reagans. Cendant does not 
explain why the claimed improper creation of the vacant lot taints the house lot. This Court 
should hold that the vague possibility of someday providing1 a house for his parents on the 
retained, vacant lot did not affect the house lot. 
Even if the lots are considered together, the primary purpose for creating the sub-ten 
acre parcels was to obtain a lower interest rate. Particularly when viewed as required in the 
light most favorable to Reagans, the desire for a lower interest was clearly the motivating 
impetus behind the creation of the lots, and the vague possibility of perhaps someday 
building a house for Mr. Reagan's parents was negligible in comparison. 
lThere was no evidence that Mr. Reagan contemplated selling the lot to his parents, only 
that he might want to add another home for his parents if he ever wanted to. (R. 161.) 
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Cendant labels the emphasis on primary purpose as "sophistry," claiming, without 
supporting citation to legislative history or to any authority other than ipse dixit, that the 
statute was written broadly with the intent of enabling "local governments to be able to 
control the hypothecation of property within their jurisdictions." Cendant's brief p. 9. 
Cendant further asserts, again without supporting analysis or authority, that "it is obvious that 
the Legislature intended that landowners seek local government approval before willy-nilly 
subdividing their land." Cendant's brief p. 11. If the Legislature had the intent of broadly 
requiring local governments to control property divisions, the Legislature would have 
prohibited all property divisions made without local government approval. The Legislature 
did not do so. Instead, the Legislature limited the application of the statute. Cendant would 
have this Court pretend the limitation did not exist. 
The statute and ordinances here prohibit division of property only if it is for "the 
purpose" of resale or development. Reagans' initial brief explained that the phrase "the 
purpose" must refer only to the primary purpose or the motivating purpose, as opposed to an 
incidental purpose. Cendant opposes this argument by asserting that "if the Legislature had 
intended that a 'primacy' requirement apply to the statute, it could have added the word 
'only' or 'primary' before the language 'for the purpose of.'" Cendant's brief at 10. 
While the Legislature could have added any number of redundant terms to emphasize 
its intent, it should not be required to do so. The definite article "the" "is a word of 
limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of'a' or 'an.'" Brooks v. Zabka. 
450 P.2d 653, 655 (Colo. 1969) (citations omitted). Accord State v. Gonzales. 2000 UT 
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App. 136, fflf 15, 28, 2 P.3d 954, 958 n.2, 961 (both the majority and concurring opinions 
agreed on the limiting nature of "the"). In State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah Ct. 
Ap. 1995), comparing the difference between "a" and "the," the court noted that "we assume 
the Legislature chooses its words with care . . . ." If the Legislature intended to regulate 
divisions of property motivated in even the smallest way by a purpose of development or 
resale, it would have been easy for the Legislature to substitute the word "a" or "any" for 
"the." The Legislature did not do so, and this Court should not presume the Legislature had 
an intent different that implied from the words the Legislature used. 
The Court must reject Cendant's ridiculous argument that a primacy requirement 
"would encourage people to lie about their reason for dividing their property" and "[open] 
the doors and protections of the judiciary to liars." (Cendant's brief at 10.) Courts are well 
experienced with evaluating the honesty of litigants. Perjury laws and penalties for false 
applications to governmental entities provide adequate protection against the occasional 
dishonest person. There certainly is no warrant to adopt a strained construction of a statute 
just to minimize the incentive for deceit. 
Although it would have been easy to do so, the statute and ordinance do not require 
prior government approval for all divisions of land. A division other than for the purpose of 
resale or development is not regulated. Cendant would have this Court eliminate the 
exception, which the Court cannot do. 
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II: A LATENT VIOLATION OF A SUBDIVISION REGULATION 
IS NOT AN ENCUMBRANCE. 
Reagans' initial brief relied on Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,48 
P.3d 895, as stating the law in Utah regarding covenants in a warranty deed. Reagans also 
mentioned an older Utah case, Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962), which 
Reagans acknowledged did not decide the "illegal subdivision as encumbrance" issue, and 
a recent Idaho case, Hoffef v. Callister, 47 P.3d 1261 (Idaho 2002), which did. In response, 
Cendant ignores the Holmes and Hoffer cases and claims that Reagans' primary authority 
was Ellis. (Cendanfs brief at 13-14.) More troubling, Cendant falsely asserts that "the 
Reagans admit that the majority of courts across the country" are contrary to the Reagans' 
position. (Cendanfs brief at 14.) No such admission was made, and the cases cited by 
Cendant do not support Cendanfs position. 
Bianchi v. Lorenz, 701 A.2d 1037 (Vt. 1997), dealt with the sale of a dwelling which 
lacked a certificate of occupancy. The lack of a certificate, which could be determined by 
a simple search of government records, was critical to the court's holding. 701 A.2d 1040-
41. The claimed violation in this case could not be determined from a simple search of 
government records. 
The Bianchi court relied on an earlier V ermont case, Hunter Broadcasting, Inc. v. City 
of Burlington, 670 A.2d 836 (Vt. 1995), which held that sale of an improperly divided lot 
violated the warranty against encumbrances. The ordinance at issue in Hunter, however, 
prohibited any division of property into a lot of less than ten acres without state and local 
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subdivision approval and imposed a lien against the property for the statutory fine. 670 A.2d 
at 838. Again, critical to the court's decision was the fact that the lack of subdivision 
approval could be easily determined from government records. The court distinguished prior 
decisions holding that a latent zoning violation is not an encumbrance, because the 
subdivision ordinance in Hunter applied to all lots of less than ten acres. 670 A.2d at 840. 
In the instant case, in contrast, the violation of the zoning regulation is latent. Under 
the Utah statutory scheme, not all divisions of land are "subdivisions" subject to the approval 
process. In Utah, in contrast to the situation in Hunter, the legality of the land division 
depends on the purpose for the division, something which cannot be discovered from public 
records. Under the logic of Hunter, therefore, the alleged zoning violation here would not 
be an "encumbrance." 
The other cases Cendant cites which were relied upon by Bianchi also involved 
violations apparent from the public records. In Feit v. Donahue, 826 P.2d 407 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1992), the court found an encumbrance where the sellers had not complied with a 
condition in the sellers' building permit on a remodel, resulting in revocation of the 
certificate of occupancy for the remodel. The Feit court noted that determination of whether 
a violation is an encumbrance is based on practical considerations regarding whether the 
violation can be discovered. 826 P.2d at 411. As explained above, that is not the case here. 
The case of FFG, Inc. v. Jones, 708 P.2d 836 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1985), cited by 
Cendant, held that a building code violation did not constitute an encumbrance. The zoning 
violation cases cited in FFG all dealt with matters which would be revealed by the public 
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records. Seymour v. Evans, 608 So.2d 1141 (Miss. 1992), similar to Hunter, involved a 
subdivision ordinance which prohibited divisions of land based solely on area, such that the 
fact of violation would be obvious from the public records. The ordinance and statute at 
issue here, in contrast, are invoked only if the division is for a particular purpose-something 
not discoverable if the land has not been developed. 
Cendant cites no Utah case in support of its position nor does Cendant attempt to 
show that the primary Utah case cited by Reagan (Holmes) is inapplicable. Instead, Cendant 
cites to cases from other jurisdictions. Each of those cases is distinguishable. This Court 
should hold that a zoning or other regulatory violation which is not readily discernible from 
the public records is not an "encumbrance" and the existence of such a violation does not 
breach the warranty against encumbrances. 
Ill: REAGANS DID NOT BREACH THE WARRANTY OF GOOD 
RIGHT TO CONVEY. 
Reagans quoted from the 2002 Utah Supreme Court opinion of Holmes Development. 
LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 895, to establish that a conveyance of an unapproved 
parcel of land does not violate the covenant of good right to convey. (Reagans' brief at pp. 
19-20.) The Utah Supreme Court relied on the case of Seymour v. Evans, 608 So.2d 1141 
(Miss 1992). The Seymour court held "a deed which runs afoul of subdivision regulations 
is perfectly valid despite the violation." 608 So.2d at 1145. 
Cendant's response is to quote the statutory warranty and assert that f,how the 
Reagans can claim that they didn't breach this covenant is a mystery that the Reagans have 
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yet to explain." (Cendant's brief p. 13.) The only mystery is what additional explanation 
Cendant expected beyond the arguments and binding authority cited in Reagans' brief For 
the reasons explained in Holmes and Seymour, as outlined in Reagans' initial brief, this 
Court should hold that the conveyance of the divided parcel did not breach of covenant of 
good right to convey. 
IV: RESCISSION WAS IMPROPER WHERE FACT ISSUES 
REMAINED AS TO WHETHER REAGANS COULD BE 
RESTORED TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, 
Reagans' initial brief argued that summary judgment of rescission was inappropriate 
where there existed a factual issue concerning whether Cendant could return the property to 
Reagans in the same condition as received. In support, Reagans cited a Utah Supreme Court 
case and a Court of Appeals case, both of which are still good law. Cendant takes umbrage 
because Reagans did not also cite to another Court of Appeals decision, Anderson v. Poms, 
1999 UT App 207, 984 P.2d 392. 
Anderson, decided following a three-day trial, does not address the issue raised in 
Reagans' brief of whether summary judgment of rescission was improper where fact issues 
remained. Reagans agree that determining how to place the parties in status quo ante is an 
equitable process. But, where the facts show that may not be possible because of the 
extensive damage to the property, granting summary judgment was improper. 
The Utah Supreme Court opinion in 50 West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989), held: "Generally, if the parties cannot 
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be put back in statu quo, a contract can be rescinded only where the clearest and strongest 
reason and equity imperatively demand it." 784 P.2d at 1170-71 (citation omitted). The 
Court of Appeals in Anderson could not have overruled this statement of the Utah Supreme 
Court, nor did it purport to. 
The contested issue in Anderson was whether rescission was barred by laches. 
Anderson is not controlling on the issue raised in Reagans' brief. The issue here is whether 
summary judgment should have been granted in the face of disputed material facts. 
Anderson does not deal with that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law prohibits a division of property without subdivision approval only if "the 
purpose" of the division is for development or resale. The only purpose for creating the lot 
sold to Cendant was to reduce the interest rate on Reagans' loan. There was at least a 
disputed factual issue concerning what was the primary purpose for creating the lot. 
This Court should hold that the creation of the lot sold to Cendant was not improper, 
or that even if it was improper, it did not breach the covenant of good right to convey or the 
covenant against encumbrances. Alternatively, the Court should remand for trial to 
determine the primary purpose for creating the lot. 
DATED this s^fday of September, 2002. 
DON R. PETERSEN and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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